Russia-Ukraine War Flash Report - 08 FEB 2024 16:00 PDT - That Aged Like Room Temperature Milk

President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy, dismissed the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, after weeks of speculation. Zaluzhnyi's number two, the Commander of the Ground Forces of Ukraine, Colonel General Alexander Syrskyi, has been named the new CiC.

The rift between Zelenskyy and Zaluzhnyi is well-known and spilled into the public domain in November. Zaluzhnyi published an essay in The Economist, declaring that the ongoing war against Russian aggression was in a stalemate, which drew a sharp rebuke from President Zelenskyy.

Zaluzhnyi reportedly was at odds with the civilian government with his request to accelerate mobilization and add 400,000 new troops. He is also critical of the anti-corruption sweeps of the  Territorial Recruitment Center (TCC) and medical boards. He wasn't against the desperately needed reforms but was against how it was executed. The mass removal of leadership across Ukraine created a vacuum, slowing mobilization and recruitment.

Syrskyi was born in the Vladimir Oblast in Soviet Russia in 1965. His family moved to Ukraine in 1980, and after completing his primary education, he went to the Moscow Higher Military Command School, graduating the same year the Soviet Union reached its apex of military and political power in 1986. Syrskyi started in artillery and served in Afghanistan during the Soviet withdrawal.

Prior to Russia's 2014 invasion of Crimea, he was the commander of the Ukrainian 72nd Mechanized Brigade and one of the principles in forging small joint training programs with NATO in 2013. The Ukrainian military has been involved in joint peacekeeping missions and military exercises with the United Nations since 1992, including the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. 

He was the chief of anti-terror operations in 2014 when Russia invaded Crimea and started its war of aggression in the Donbas. Syrskyi was one of the principal commanders during the 2015 Debaltseve offensives and retreat. Russian forces blew the bridges on the previously agreed green corridors for Ukrainian forces to withdraw, with up to 2,000 soldiers killed in what amounted to a massacre.

He has been the Commander of the Ground Forces of Ukraine since 2019 and is said to have a positive relationship with Zaluzhnyi.

Syrskyi led the defense of Kyiv and the Kharkiv counteroffensive. Both were major defeats for the Russian military. He also led the controversial defense of Soledar and Bakhmut.

He has a reputation for not wanting to hear any bad news, to the point that subordinates are reportedly afraid of him. He also has been unfavorably compared to World War II United States General George S. Patton for his willingness to accept major losses. It would be an exaggeration to say that the average Ukrainian infantryman hates Syrskyi, but he is not well-liked by many.

If you're newer to our war coverage, we were overall supportive of Ukraine's tactics in Bakhmut. The main Russian ground force was PMC Wagner Group, which, by their own admission, suffered 41,000 killed in action and 16,000 permanently disabled. A year ago, Wagner was the most effective fighting force aligned with Moscow and, in terms of active duty mercenaries, would have been the 54th largest military on the planet. In the aftermath, PMC Wagner leaders led an insurrection in Russia, were likely assassinated, and the ranks purged over the last eight months. The treachery led by Yevgeny Prigozhin increased the paranoia in President Vladimir Putin's orbit, and it led to a second purge, which continues to this day, of so-called "turbo patriots."

We were vehemently against sending poorly trained territorial guard units to defend some of the most critical areas and how elite units like the 92nd Motor Infantry Brigade were utilized. History will decide if Syrskyi was right. Today, Russian forces remain stuck in Bakhmut and, in the last 12 months, have only made small gains toward Ivanivske and captured the village of Khromove.

Both Zaluzhnyi and Syrskyi have shied away from deep involvement with the press, but Zaluzhnyi is considered the more charismatic of the two.

In our assessment, we don't understand how the appointment of Syrskyi represents a "new direction" and "reset" of military command. He has had a deep influence on the strategies used by Ukraine since Russia expanded its war of aggression almost two years ago. Syrskyi's willingness to accept high losses suggests that his military education in Moscow still influences his decision-making process. That's both good and bad. It's good because he received the same training as his adversaries, so he knows how they think. It's bad because in a purely attritional war - Ukraine can't win. 

Looking through the lens of a belligerent fighting against Ukraine, we would perceive Syrskyi as a dangerous risk-taker who, if he can create a breakthrough, can develop plans that support rapid advances using maneuver warfare. We would aim to draw him into an attritional war, given his history of accepting high losses, and work to frustrate his command decisions by creating scenarios of, "if I commit just one more brigade, I can make my breakthrough."

At this time, any thoughts of a Ukrainian offensive beyond active defense are a fantasy. Artillery ammunition is catastrophically low, and the global commitments through 2024 will only permit Ukraine to fire 2,000 to 2,500 rounds per day through the rest of the year. Some combat-destroyed Ukrainian companies remain on the frontlines, partially due to the impact of the anti-corruption sweeps of the TCC.

While our analyst team is multinational, no one is from or lives in Ukraine. It is important to note that while our insight and analysis are helpful, the decisions made in Kyiv belong to the sovereign nation of Ukraine.

If you're looking for our assessment on whether this is a net bad or good, the only thing we can offer up is an opinion, and we're not paid for our opinions unless I need a cathartic purge (like yesterday) and the snark claws come out.

We maintain the following.

• All future military plans made by the General Staff need to be based on the assumption that Ukraine won't get one more cent or bullet from the United States. That includes already committed resources that have not been delivered. Congress could pass legislation to claw those commitments back. If the impasse is broken, then the new resources are additive.
• The biggest priority is to fix the TCCs and medical boards and reform the laws on mobilization and conscription. Part of that work is ongoing - mobilization reform, but the TCCs remain completely broken.
• Despite the current personnel shortage, Ukraine has to stop the practice of sending under-trained troops to the front. This is past a moral imperative; it's a practical one. Every day of training provides a new soldier with more knowledge on the sneaky ways the enemy will try to kill you while learning new sneaky ways to kill your enemy. Ukraine is in no position to trade lives for Russian artillery shells and airstrikes.
• Zelenskyy is reportedly deeply involved in some military decisions, leading to politics dictating some battlefield decisions. There are strong arguments that influenced the defense of Bakhmut. He is an incredibly skilled politician, and yes, even Winston Churchill was overly involved in military decisions. But Ukraine doesn't have the resources and allies that Field Marshal Montgomery enjoyed in 1944. After D-Day, the U.K. could afford to make disastrous mistakes like the planning of Operation Market Garden. Ukraine does not have this luxury, and Zelenskyy should get less involved.
• Ukraine needs to focus purely on defensive operations in 2024 while maintaining enough combat strength to maintain an active defense. The long-term plan should focus on 2025 and should assume that Donald Trump is reelected in the United States.
• Finally, Ukraine needs to utilize asymmetrical warfare a lot more. In our assessment, the moment the United States ended funding is the moment when Kyiv should have stopped worrying about things that might upset Washington, like striking targets within Russia. In many ways, Ukraine has more political power now because of the military aid impasse. Europe and NATO can't pull its support. The region has finally figured out they're next. Terror tactics against Russian civilians are absolutely off-limits, but insurgent activity that targets Russian industry, military production, logistics, politicians, and propagandists - inside and outside of Russia - should increase dramatically. Unleash Lieutenant General Kyrylo Budanov.