Russia-Ukraine Flash Report for 17 FEB 2024 15:30 PST - Avdiivka Falls

Yes, you're getting a Saturday update.

No, World War III did not break out, and you don't need to panic build your bunker.

Around 02:00 hours PST, based on pictures and videos that were geolocated by the Euro team, we were all convinced that Ukraine was doing a complete withdrawal from Avdiivka. That withdrawal is complete, including the Avdiivka Coke Plant. The war map has been updated.

The 3rd Separate Assault Brigade was brought in to stabilize the ground lines of communication (GLOC) to facilitate the withdrawal. Colonel General Sryskyi reported that an undisclosed number of Ukrainian troops were captured during the withdrawal. The number is more significant than Severodonetsk (dozens) but not as significant at Mariupol (thousands) - which we know is a wide range.

The withdrawal decision aligns with our assessment from the start of the week that the defense had become untenable after Russian forces reached the Industrial'nyy Prospekt.

In the last 24 hours, we geolocated the Russian flag raised at the water treatment plant near Kruta Balka, at the southeast corner of the Avdiivka Coke Plant, in the central park, and in the 9th District.

Russian sources have shared pictures of Ukrainian troops that appear to have been executed, which aligns with a shift in messaging in the information space. Russian military leaders have become much more transparent in the last two weeks on admitting and celebrating war crimes.

The withdrawal can't be called a retrograde operation due to the capture of personnel and the loss of equipment. The 3rd Brigade suffered heavy casualties, with stabilize stations close to overwhelmed.

There are inadequate pre-built defenses along what would have been the third echelon in the Avdiivka area of operation (AO). Over the summer, this was a political decision due to the optics on the international stage if Ukraine decided to dig in. In our assessment, that doesn't hold in February 2024. Our team assessed at the start of October that Russia was "all-in" and would capture Avdiivka regardless of the cost, and U.S. aid was already cut off. Privately, we believed there would not be further aid and made the editorial decision not to share that in October because it would be viewed as "defeatest." Your CCO is pretty scarred from June 2023. 

Ukraine had every reason to build static defenses by October. The work is described as inadequate. Ongoing efforts are complicated by a lack of funds.

What's next? 

Russian forces will have to consolidate their gains and establish logistics. They'll also have to sweep and clear the city. Given the speed of the retreat, its disorganized nature, and the critical shortages of almost everything to fight a war, we're unsure how much mining activity was done. Still, establishing logistics and controls will take time. The Russian losses of armor, especially armored personnel carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, theoretically should buy Ukraine additional time. It doesn't change the reality that Russia is going to have to move across open beet fields to continue its advance. It is more likely Russia will move to another AO. Likely Kupyansk or Bakhmut/Klishchiivka. 

Why did Avdiivka fall?

Two years ago, we assessed the key to Avdiivka was the Krasnohorivka Plateau. Ukraine was able to use the plateau as a firebase and for surveillance, preventing Russian advances from the east and the south. The terrain made it a natural fortress. When Russia captured Krasnohorivka last year, it could not establish firebases there, and Ukraine held fire control on the GLOCs right up to the fall of Avdiivka. Almost half of Russia's armored losses since October happened 2 to 5 kilometers from the line of conflict on the GLOCs to or through Krasnohorivka. But without the firebase, Ukraine couldn't stop the advances into the city. Once Russia committed a force of 50,000 in October, it was clear they were "all in." We had repeatedly assessed for two years it would take at least 50,000 Russian troops and approximately 6 months of sustained attacks to capture the settlement. 

If Ukraine had been supplied with an additional 90,000 artillery shells/Grad rockets a month of any caliber (122, 152, 155), we believe they could have continued to hold their early January defensive lines. The ammunition shortages significantly contributed to the defensive collapse. The approximate cost to the 50ish members of the Ukraine Defense Contract Group would have been $300 to 350 million a month starting in December.

What have we learned about Alexander Sryskyi?

The widespread message, including from respected analysts, that Sryskyi would repeat Bakhmut was wrong at best and destructively false at worst. I'll die on this hill. Ukraine made the right decision at Bakhmut. They made the right decision at Avdiivka. An argument could be made that Ukraine stayed 48 to 72 hours too long, but Sryskyi inherited the situation, at least partially, and can't be fully blamed for the state of the defensive action.

What about the rest of the theater of war?

The short-term concern is that the VKS can now intensify airstrikes in other parts of Ukraine. That will be the signal of where the next offensive push will begin. The ammunition shortages are a two-fold problem. There is a funding problem. Without more monetary aid, Ukraine can't purchase ammunition on the market. There is a production problem. Ukraine's collective allies can't match the combined production of Russia, North Korea, and Iran. Both are frustrating, and both were preventable. We assessed two years ago that Europe and the United States needed to move to a war economy lite. Yes, I've read the comments and the arguments that this takes time, and you can't increase ammunition production overnight. Bulgaria, Finland, and Germany have blown those arguments apart, and Germany is already producing more 155 mm shells per month than the United States. 

The good news is it is fixable.

Before Russia started receiving military aid from North Korea, the number of artillery rounds (122 tubed and barrel, 152) fired a day had dropped to approximately 5,000. That's an annual production rate of 1.9 million shells a year, which aligns with their estimated production of 2 million a year. We have no faith in a recent report that Russia has increased production to 4 million shells a year. The supply from North Korea doubled the daily rate to 10,000 shells/rockets a day. The ammunition from North Korea is being pulled from existing stock, and that isn't an infinite resource. 

Russia has already raided Belarus, and while Iran is also supplying ammunition, Iran has other customers they are supporting.

Can the 50-ish member nations of the Ukraine Defense Contract Group bring production to a collective 7,000 shells a day? A manageable deficit? Yes. There is no question. The bigger question is the political will.

From this point, you need to prepare yourself for more difficult news. The best thing to hope for now is either an extremely cold March - a repeat of 2022 - or an extremely wet one. Either will slow the Russian advances down.